In the past few years, visual cryptography scheme (VCS) has aroused much research attention and developed rapidly because of its simple decryption. However, meaningless shares remain a continuing challenge of VCS to its practical applications. In this paper, we propose a (k, n)-VCS combining with QR codes. To enlarge the allowable maximum size of secret image, a probabilistic sharing model is utilized. Based on it, a secret sharing method is presented with high relative difference. Furthermore, we embed the initial shares into cover QR codes by using encoding redundancy. After that, each share is meaningful and can be read by any standard QR code reader. Different from previous work, error correction capacities of the covers are perfectly preserved. We also highlight that our scheme can be used to authenticate the security of QR codes from some uncertain sources. Finally, experimental results and comparisons are provided to show the feasibility and advantages of the proposed scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Visual cryptography scheme [1] (VCS) is a kind of image sharing technology that was first proposed by Naor and Shamir. The basic model of VCS is to distribute a secret image into a number of shares. The secret can be visually decrypted by stacking any qualified subset of shares while forbidden subsets cannot. Because of low-computation decryption, VCS has attracted much research attention, and related studies have been continuously investigated, including recovery effect promotion [2] - [4] , access structure flexibility [5] , [6] , image color extension [7] , [8] and sharing strategy enrichment [9] - [11] . However, shares in most schemes are meaningless, which will easily arouse attackers' suspicion when transmitting via public channels, and in addition, inconvenience of managing these shares is increased. To generate meaningful shares, [1] and [12] - [14] added some columns to the basis matrices. These extra columns were used to carry the cover information of each share. For better visual effect, [15] - [17] introduced halftone technology into the design of schemes. However, there was still much noise visible in the shares with poor visual effect.
QR code is a kind of machine recognition code developed by the Japanese Denso Wave Company, and now has been adopted as a universal specification performed by ISO [18] .
With the development of intelligent handset technology, QR code has been widely used in applications such as product propaganda, electric identity and mobile payment. Because of the low visual recognition feature, acquiring the message of a QR code by human vision is almost impossible. In turn, the QR code can be an excellent mask for VCS since its dark and light modules are evenly distributed with random look. Therefore, combinations of the VCS and QR codes have been considerably investigated [19] - [22] , [27] . Based on machine recognition characteristic, a scheme with two-level information storage was presented [21] . In that scheme, decoding shares were inconvenient unless a quite appropriate scanning distance and angle is found. And then, a (n, n) sharing method was designed by exploiting error correction mechanism of QR codes [22] . Later, under random grids theory [23] - [26] , a (k, n)-VCS were implemented in [27] , where relative difference of the recovered secret requires further improving. Moreover, error correction capacities of the shares were decreased in [22] and [27] since some codewords were modified during the sharing process. That may influence the robustness of QR codes to symbol damage or loss.
In this paper, we propose a (k, n)-VCS combining with QR codes. By classifying all minimal qualified subsets, we present a method of constructing sharing matrix sets. This design is based on probabilistic sharing model, of which the unexpanded property allows larger secret size. Additionally, higher, or even perfect, recovered performance can be achieved. Further, we utilize the encoding redundancy of QR codes to embed original shares into their corresponding covers. Finally, a number of meaningful shares are obtained. Compared with previous work, error correction capacities are fully preserved in this paper. Experimental results and comparisons show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces some preliminaries concerning our study. The proposed scheme is described in Section III while its validity is theoretically proved in Section IV. Section V provides the experiments and analysis to illustrate the feasibility of this work and how it improves on previous work. Finally, conclusions are given in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
The maximum size of QR codes limits the largest secret payload allowable in QR codes. The larger pixel expansion means the smaller size of secret image. Therefore, probabilistic method [28] - [30] is adopted because it has no pixel expansion.
A. PROBABILISTIC METHOD
By probabilistic method, secret pixels are correctly restored with a certain probability. To promote an understanding of the subsequent results, Table I gives the denotation of symbols used in our study. Definition 1: Suppose there are two sets of n-dimensional
To share a white (or black) pixel, we randomly select a column from C 1 (or C 0 ) and distribute its row i to share i. Then, a (k, n)-VCS based on probabilistic method is formed if C 0 and C 1 satisfy the following conditions. 
(a) is contrast condition, which indicates that any k participants can obtain the secret information by probabilistic difference. And if there are more than k participants, only k from them are required. (b) is security condition, ensuring that less than k participants are inaccessible to the secret.
B. QR CODES
QR codes have a number of data capacities under different V-E. V (1∼40) is the version number, which determines the size of a QR code. E (L, M, Q, H) denotes four error correction levels, corresponding to four error correction capacities (7%, 15%, 25%, 30%), respectively. Fig. 1 is the structure of version 7. As shown, each QR code includes two parts: encoding region and functional patterns. The former contains version or format information, data and error correction codewords. The latter includes some patterns designed for geometric correction and efficient recognition. Fig. 2 illustrates the main encoding and decoding procedures of a QR code.
During the encoding procedure, XOR-ing with mask patterns are required to guarantee that 1011101 will not occur in regions out of finder patterns, avoiding influence on symbol orientation. Because the white and black pixels of original shares are randomly distributed, symbol orientation of QR codes will not be affected even if the shares are embedded. So the version and format information of cover QR codes are unchanged in our design.
In addition, a QR code may have multiple blocks. Each block is composed of some data codewords and corresponding error correction codewords calculated by Reed-Solomon code. In Section III-B, all operations on codewords are performed block by block. 
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
An overview of the proposed scheme is shown in Fig. 3 . In Fig. 3 , designing matrix sets of (k, n) probabilistic sharing and method of embedding are two key points of our study. Fig. 4 exhibits the processes to construct matrix sets. By specifying equivalent relationship among participants, the initial collection is divided into several sub-collections. Then, basic matrices for each sub-collection can be obtained with two matrix units M k,even and M k,odd . After that, we connect these basic matrices and transform the result into the final matrix sets.
A. DESIGN OF MATRIX SETS
The detailed algorithm is provided. Example 1: To understand this algorithm better, an example of (2, 4)-VCS is given below.
Initially, 0 = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}, {3, 4}}. First, we choose Q = {1, 3} ∈ 0 . Let P 1 = {1, 2}, P 2 = {3, 4}, then we can get 1 = {{1, 3}, {1, 4}, 
Algorithm 1
Input: A participant set P = {1, 2, · · · , n} and initial collection of all minimal qualified subsets 0 = {A||A| = k, A ⊆ P}.
Output: Matrix sets C 0 and C 1 .
Step 1:
Step 2:
Step 3; else, let d = i and go to Step 6.
Step 3:
Delete 0 ∩ i from 0 , and redefine P as all participants in current 0 . Then, go to Step 4.
Step 4: Construct two n × 2 k null matrices B i 0 and B i 1 .
, and go to Step 5.
Step 5: Assign values to remaining rows. According to
Step 6: Horizontally connect all basic matrices
. Then delete common columns of B 0 and B 1 , that is, (B 0 , B 1 ) = del(B 0 , B 1 ). Go to Step 7.
Step 7: Get the final matrix sets C 0 = Tr(B 0 ) and C 1 = Tr(B 1 ), then algorithm ends. {2, 3}, {2, 4}} and two basic matrices:
Similarly, we obtain the other sub-collection 2 = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}} and its corresponding basic matrices:
By ''ř '', ''del(·)'' and ''Tr(·)'' operations, final sets are formed:
If the secret pixel is black, we arbitrarily get an n × 1 matrix from C 0 ; else, randomly select a matrix from C 1 . For the chosen matrix, assign the element of each row to its corresponding share. Then, the original shares are generated.
B. DESIGN OF EMBEDDING METHOD
After initial sharing, meaningful shares are supposed in this section. According to [18] , any QR code has a determined data and error correction capacity if its version and error correction level are given. In most cases, all codewords of a block includes three parts, as shown in Fig. 5 . To obtain the message of a QR code, valid data cannot be modified since it concerns all useful information of decoding. Padding data are added to fill encoding redundancy and error correction codewords are designed to restore original data even if some errors exist. By analysis, we will use padding data to design meaningful shares.
First, the size of cover QR codes is determined. Suppose the original shares are Tr 1 , Tr 2 , · · · , Tr n with the size of a×b. We calculate the least number of data codewords
With a given error correction level, we can infer the required version h of QR codes. Further, check whether the region size of padding data is adequate for embedding an original share. If not, h = h + 1 until the size is large enough.
Next, embed original shares into their covers C 1 , C 2 , · · · , C n . Suppose the top left corner of embedding region is (p, q).
Finally, recalculate error correction codewords for current data codewords. Then, final messages before XOR-ing mask patterns are prepared.
IV. VALIDITY PROOF
Security and relative difference are two crucial properties to determine the validity of a VCS. Since embedding process will not change the security and relative difference of original shares, we only need to discuss the validity of probabilistic method in this section.
A. SECURITY
Lemma 1: If A = con (C, D) , B = con(C, E) and |A| = |B|, for ∀Q ∈ 2 P , there is
(1)
Apparently, (1) is satisfied.
Proof: Because A Q = con(β 1Q , β 2Q , · · · , β sQ ), the frequency of [0] in {⊕(β 1Q ), ⊕(β 2Q ), · · · , ⊕(β sQ )} is equal to the number of 0 in ⊕(A Q ). Thus, (3) is proved.
Proof: According to (1) 
Proof: According to Lemma 3, if Q ⊆ Q qual ∈ i , we can get the result of (6) .
If no Q qual ∈ i satisfies Q ⊆ Q qual , and |Q| < k, there must be two rows at least of B i 0 and B i 1 are identical. Assume that ∃X = {p, q} ∈ Q, B i 0 (p) = B i 0 (q) and B i 1 (p) = B i 1 (q). Then, both ⊕(B i 0 X ) and ⊕(B i 1 X ) are 0 vectors. So 
With (7) and (8), we can infer that
In conclusion, Theorem 2 is proved. 
According to Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, (10) is true, which demonstrates the security of the proposed scheme.
B. RELATIVE DIFFERENCE

Lemma 4: Suppose B i
0 and B i 1 are two basic matrices of i with m columns. For ∀Q ∈ i , there is (11) 
Proof: If Q ∈ j (|Q| = k), there must be at least two elements in Q, of which the corresponding rows in (14) can be inferred by Lemma 4.
Meanwhile, since Q / ∈ t (t = i 1 , i 2 , · · · , i h ), according to Lemma 5, we can deduce that
Since C 0 = Tr(B 0 ) and C 1 = Tr(B 1 ) while B 0 = con(B 0 , X ) and B 1 = con(B 1 , X ), we can obtain the final conclusion of (13) . Therefore, the relative difference is proved.
V. EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, feasibility of the proposed scheme, including security, secret recovery and meaningful shares, is illustrated by experiments. In addition, some comparisons and analysis on related work are provided.
A. EXPERIMENTS
For (3, 4)-VCS, we get two divided sub-collections 1 = {{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}} and 2 = {{1, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 4}}. Further, matrix sets of probabilistic sharing are formed. Fig. 6 is the experimental result of (3, 4)-VCS. Fig. 6 (a)-(d) are shares T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , and T 4 , respectively. As shown, a single share reveals no information about the secret while its cover message is readable. Fig. 6 (e) gives the decoding result of T 1 . We use the demonstration software provided by ZXing.Net to decode the QR codes in our paper. Fig. 6 (f) is the secret image S with the size of 80 × 80. Fig. 6 (g) shows the XOR-ed result of {1, 2}, indicating that any two participants cannot restore the secret information. By XOR-ing the shares of any qualified subset, the secret is revealed and can be visually recognized, as shown in Fig. 6 (h) . 
According to probabilistic sharing sets, for a qualified subset, the possibility of recovering a black pixel is 1 if the secret pixel is black. In addition, the possibility of obtaining a black pixel is 0.5 when the secret pixel is white. Thus, the relative difference in this experiment is 0.5.
By the algorithm in Section III-A, one subset may belong to multiple sub-collections simultaneously. In such case, this subset can reconstruct the secret with higher relative difference than others. For instance, in (2, 4)-VCS the initial collection is divided into two sub-collections 1 = {{1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}} and 2 = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}}. Apparently, subsets {1, 4} and {2, 3} are both contained by 1 and 2 . Then, the sharing sets are constructed. Fig. 7 is the experimental result of (2, 4)-VCS. Fig. 7 (a)-(d) are shares T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , and T 4 , all of which can be correctly decoded by QR code readers. Fig. 7 (e) shows the decoding result of T 1 . Fig. 7 (f) is the original secret S with the size of 22 × 19. Fig. 7 (g) and (h) are recovered images r 1 = T 1 ⊕ T 2 and r 2 = T 1 ⊕ T 4 . In line with C 0 and C 1 , the possibility that {1, 2} restores a black pixel when the secret pixel is black (or white) is 1 (or 0.5). So the relative difference of {1, 2} is 0.5. Different from {1, 2}, {1, 4} is contained in both 1 and
B. ANALYSIS 1) ERROR CORRECTION CAPACITY
Error correction is a significant property of QR codes. It allows some errors or damage in the symbol, which makes QR codes more suitable for practical usage. Compared with other related work, error correction capacities of all cover QR codes are completely remained in our proposed scheme. Fig. 8 shows the comparison result of this paper and [22] and [27] . [27] ; (f) decoding of (e). Fig. 8 (a) , (c), and (e) are the damaged shares of this paper and [22] and [27] , respectively, of which the corresponding decoding results are given by Fig. 8 (b) , (d), and (f). As shown, the damaged share of our paper can be correctly decoded. Actually, the proposed scheme remains full error correction capacity of the cover QR code because the error correction code is recalculated. Likewise, [22] and [27] are also based on error correction mechanism but they modifies partial codes. Therefore, the error correction capacity is decreased.
2) RELATIVE DIFFERENCE
In previous work, probabilistic sharing and random grids are two methods of constructing VCS without pixel expansion. In Table II , we compare the relative difference of our paper with these unexpanded schemes [23] - [26] , [28] , [29] .
References [23] - [26] designed schemes with random grids while [28] , [29] , and our study utilized probabilistic method. According to Table II , the recovered secrets in [23] , [24] , [28] , and [29] have poor visual performance because their recovery is based on OR operation, in which the white pixels cannot be reconstructed under semi group structure. References [25] , [26] , and our scheme has introduced XOR operation. Apparently, the relative difference of our scheme performs better than that of [25] and [26] , especially when k = n the secret can be completely recovered. In addition, the values of our paper given in Table II are the low bounds under different (k, n) thresholds. For a specific subset, the value may be higher if the subset is contained by multiple sub-collections.
To show the comparison result more explicitly, Fig. 9 exhibits the restored secrets of (3, 4)-VCS by our method and methods of [23] - [26] , [28] , and [29] .
As shown in Fig. 9 (a), (b) , (g), and (f), images of [23] , [24] , [28] , and [29] are dark because white pixels are unable to reconstruct in these schemes. Compared with above results, visual effect of Fig. 9 (c), (d) , and (g) are more satisfying. Apparently, our recovered secret preserves more image features and looks best.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a novel (k, n)-VCS in which all of the shares are valid QR codes with specific meaning. It reduces the likelihood of being suspected by potential attackers when the shares are distributed via public channels. Additionally, error correction capacities of cover QR codes are preserved even if shares are embedded. Considering practical applications, our scheme can be used to determine the security of some QR codes from unauthorized sources. However, although we have used the probabilistic method to implement no pixel expansion, the size of secret image is still limited. How to improve the secret payload of QR codes remains an open problem to be solved. 
